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WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK
ABOUT CONTROL?
Anthony J. Sebok*
INTRODUCTION

Litigation investment, or champerty, is the maintenance of a stranger's
lawsuit for profit. 1 Litigation investment is expanding in the United States,
and as it expands, the controversy surrounding it grows. 2 Litigation
investment occurs when nonlawyers invest for profit in litigation in which
they otherwise have no interest. 3 For purposes of this Article, litigation is
the expenditure of money by a party to enforce (or defend) an existing or
anticipated legal claim, where the money is used either to purchase the
services of an attorney in anticipation of an appearance before, or
submission of materials to, an adjudicative body. 4 In the last quarter of the
twentieth century various critics emerged who argued that the American
system of litigation was in need of reform, in part because plaintiffs'
attorneys had started to view litigation as an investment, which resulted in a
marked increase in frivolous and/or socially unproductive litigation. 5

* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author served as Academic CoReporter to the American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Ethics 20/20 Working
Group on Alternative Litigation Finance and has consulted for Burford, a litigation funding
firm. None of the views in this Article are necessarily those of the ABA or Burford.
1. Litigation investment is champerty. "'[C]hamperty is maintaining a suit in return for
a financial interest in the outcome .... "' Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P ' ship, 532 S.E.2d
269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U .S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)). For review of
the history and current state of the law of champerty, see Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic
Claim, 64 VAND. L. REv. 61 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors Share in the
Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at Al ; Richard A. Epstein et al., Room for Debate,
Investing in Someone Else's Lawsuit, N .Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-Iawsuit.
3. For an excellent review, see STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING
IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS (2010); MAx VOLSKY, INVESTING
IN JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL FINANCE, LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION
FUNDING 24---25 (2013).
4 . A broader definition of litigation might include all legal dispute resolution, including
informal negotiation over disputed legal claims. Any investment of time and money, even
by a layperson- such as the drafting of a demand Jetter to a debtor by a creditor--could, in
theory, count as litigation. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We
Know and Don 't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 11-18 (1983) (discussing the "construction of
disputes" in society). The definition used in this Article is narrower.
5. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not To Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to
the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & PoL'Y 613, 630 (2012) ("[T]he plaintiffs'
bar has strong monetary incentives to create liability through repeated litigation of presently
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Litigation investment is now the object of a similar sort of critique based on
the fear that litigation will be subject to a new round of commercialization. 6
One of the leading arguments against litigation investment is that it will
interfere with the relationship between the party who has the claim and her
lawyer.7 The Institute for Legal Reform has argued that litigation
investment "undercuts plaintiff and lawyer control over litigation because
the [litigation investment] company, as an investor in the plaintiffs lawsuit,
presumably will seek to protect its investment, and can therefore be
expected to try to exert control over the plaintiffs and counsel's strategic
decisions. " 8 This concern is echoed by those worried that an attorney may
not be able to fulfill her ethical obligations if her client signs a litigation
investment contract. For example, the Professional Ethics Commission of
the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, like most ethics committees asked
for their opinion, said
[W]hile we cannot say that it is per se unethical for a lawyer to assist a
client in obtaining personal injury lawsuit advances, we do find that the
above scenario raises a number of potential ethical problems that should
be of concern to the lawyer. . . . [T]he lawyer must guard against any risk
that the financing company will attempt to control the litigation or
otherwise interfere with the lawyer's exercise ofprofessionaljudgment. 9
non-meritorious claims."). See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (discussing tort reform and the attack on the entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' bar). Nora Engstrom gives a very different evaluation of the entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' bar, arguing that the "settlement mills," operated by lawyers with an
"entrepreneurial (rather than professional) orientation," serve a valuable social function.
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 819 (2011).
6. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING
TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009), available at
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf ( arguing that litigation
investment funders "'have no interest in the justice ... only in the chances of success-as
they will demand a share of the damages awarded in return for putting up the stake money"'
(quoting Joshua Hamerman, Hedge Funds: A Litigious Bunch, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Dec. 17, 2007, at 9)); Kidd, supra note 5, at 630-31; Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus
Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 593 (2012); Roger
Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (June 28, 2011, 2:06 PM),
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/.
7. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining
that third-party funding thus "places the power to make strategic decisions about the case in
the hands of the funder").
8. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A
PROPOSAL To REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 1 (2012), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/lrTPLF_Solutions.pdf.
As one
commentator has stated, "A primary concern with litigation funding is the potential for
litigation funding companies to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the attorneys
with whom they deal in order to protect the companies' investments. In so doing, the
companies may impair the attorney's representation of his client." Douglas R. Richmond,
Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REv. 649, 669
(2005).
9. Prof! Ethics Comm'n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 191 (2006), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=87348; see State Bar of
Mich., Op. RI-321 (2000), available at https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_
opinions/ri-321.cfm; Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and
Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REY. 615, 650 (2007) (noting that litigation investment contracts
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The Ethics Committee of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section
of the New York State Bar Association cautioned in its report that litigation
investment "arguably creates a tension between the [third-party litigation
financing] investor's interest in instructing, or even mandating, that the
party make certain strategic decisions that best serve the investor's goals,
and the party's or lawyer for the party's exercise of independent
judgment." 10 The American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Ethics
20/20 and the New York City Bar Association were not as concerned over
the risk that litigation investment would interfere with an attorney's
exercise of independent judgment or loyalty.11 The New York City Bar
opinion even suggested that, consistent with obtaining consent from the
client under New York Professional Conduct Rule l.7(b)(4), a litigation
investor may "influence [a lawyer's] professional judgment in determining
the course or strategy of the litigation, including the decisions of whether to
settle or the amount to accept in any settlement." 12
These concerns have worked their way into the legal regulation of
litigation investment.
Litigation investment is allowed in only
approximately one-half of U.S. jurisdictions. 13 Many courts have held that
the common law still requires some supervision of litigation investment
contracts (although under what basis is not clear, since many of these courts
have also rejected common law champerty). 14 Virtually all jurisdictions
that allow it, however, restrict the degree of control that strangers can
exercise over the litigation. 15 Usually, an investor's power to control the

"threaten to undermine the duty of loyalty owed to a client by creating a contractual
relationship with a third party").
10. ETHICS COMM. OF THE COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIG. SECTION OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 10
(2013), available at http://www.benthamimf.com/docs/default-document-library/nys-bar--opinion-of-ethical-implications-04-16-13 .pdf?sfvrsn=2 (emphasis added).
11. See Ass'n of the Bar of the City ofN.Y. Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2
(2011 ), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/20 l l-opinions/l l 59formal-opinion-2011-02 ; see also AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20,
INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 22-23 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20 l l 12 l 2_ethics_
20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam. pdf.
12. Ass'n of the Bar of the City ofN.Y. Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2
("While a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other
aspects of a lawsuit, absent client consent, a lawyer may not permit the company to influence
his or her professional judgment in determining the course or strategy of the litigation,
including the decisions of whether to settle or the amount to accept in any settlement.").
13. See Sebok, supra note l , at 98- 99 n.162 (providing a state-by-state review).
14. See, e.g., Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (finding that
although champerty was no longer recognized in Massachusetts, courts still had inherent
power to scrutinize agreements); Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12-13 (Or. 1891) (same).
15. See, e.g., Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
an alleged champertor was not an officious intermeddler when, among other things, she did
not impose her views on the attorneys or litigants); L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass' n Prof!
Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Op. No. 500 (1999), available at http://www.lacba.org/
showpage.cfm?pageid=433 (citing Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878-79 (Ct. App.
1991)) (finding agreement invalid ifit was "tainted by outside pressures").

2942

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

litigation is reduced to zero by reference to the lawyer's ethical obligation
not to participate in a case where their client has ceded too much control. 16
This Article takes up two questions. First, whether the professional
independence protected by the restrictions on litigation investment is
similar to the professional independence protected by Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5 .4 and its various state equivalents. 17 I argue that
the doctrines constraining both litigation investment and fee splitting with
nonlawyers sweep too broadly when they prevent lay persons from buying
an interest in litigation, and that the threat of interference with lawyers'
professional independence is, in both cases, overblown. Second, I argue
that the current insurance law doctrines concerning third-party liability
insurance require litigants to give up much of the control that the doctrines
constraining litigation investment and fee splitting with nonlawyers are
designed to keep out of the hands of lay investors.
I. THE PROHIBITION ON FEE SPLITTING AND ITS RATIONALE
In this section, I review the prohibition on fee splitting itself and the
rationale that is often cited in its support, the preservation of attorneys
independent professional judgment.
A. Fee Splitting
Under the Model Rules, fee splitting with a nonlawyer is forbidden.
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 5.04(a) is typical: "A
lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to share legal fees with a
nonlawyer [with exceptions not relevant here]." 18 Historically the core
concern of the fee-splitting rule is the impermissible solicitation of clients. 19
Other and more modern rationales for the prohibition on fee splitting with
nonlawyers are the minimization of the risk of the unauthorized practice of
law, and, most important for our purposes, protecting the independent
judgment of the lawyer.20
In contrast, the District of Columbia permits a nonlawyer to receive a
portion of a fee received by a lawyer when the nonlawyer and the lawyer

16. See, e.g. , Profl Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 00-3 (2002), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBET0pin.nsf/840090c16eedaf0085256b61000928dc/f40a5
4f76a7da5a585256b800057b54l?OpenDocument ("The attorney also shall not allow the
funding company to direct the litigation, interfere with the attorney-client relationship, or
otherwise influence the attorney's independent professional judgment.").
.
17. Excluding, of course, D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4, which will be
discussed separately. See infra notes 21-23 .
18. Tux. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04(a).
19. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 16.5.5, at 911-12 (1986).
20. "The provisions of Rule 5.04(a) express traditional limitations on sharing legal fees
with nonlawyers. The principal reasons for these limitations are to prevent solicitation by
lay persons of clients for lawyers and to avoid encouraging or assisting nonlawyers in the
practice of law." TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. 1. "A person
entitled to share a lawyer' s fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer's activities so as
to maximize those fees." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 10 cmt. b (2000).
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form a "joint venture organization."21 D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct
5.4 provides that, subject to certain limitations, "[a] lawyer may practice
law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual
nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the organization
in providing legal services to clients. " 22 The lawyer and the nonlawyer may
divide the earnings of the partnership as they see fit. 23
1. Fee Splitting in a Model Rules Jurisdiction
Conventional wisdom is that it simply is not possible under the Model
Rules for a lawyer to give any part of her fees in exchange for money or
time invested by a layperson in a case. 24 The conventional wisdom is based
on a distinction drawn by the Model Rules between a financial
arrangement, in which a nonlawyer's profit or loss is directly related to the
successfulness of a lawyer's legal business, and a loan, in which both the
occurrence and amount of repayment does not depend on the lawyer's skills
and efforts. 25 According to this analysis, the repayment of debt with funds
that come from fees is not the sharing of fees because the lender's profit is
not directly related to the size of the contingent fee received by the lawyer.
For example, suppose Lawyer establishes a revolving line of credit with
Bank, which requires Lawyer to pay interest at 10 percent. 26 Obviously, the
revenue used by Lawyer to pay Bank can come from nothing other than
fees, unless Lawyer or his firm has property that is producing income (such
as the building in which the law firm sits) or Lawyer has personal assets
derived from some independent source of income or property that Lawyer
uses to secure the loan. It is obvious, therefore, that in the vast majority of
loans to lawyers, all payments to creditors constitute, in a literal sense, a
sharing of attorney's fees with nonlawyers. Nevertheless, it is well
established that interest payments to a commercial lender do not violate the

21. D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cftn.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & w. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 45.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) ("[T]he phrase 'shall not share legal fees' [in Rule 5.4(a)] is
intended to bar any financial arrangement in which a nonlawyer's profit or loss is directly
related to the successfulness of a lawyer's legal business.").
25. Id.; see WOLFRAM,supra note 19, § 16.3.
26. This well-known example is drawn from 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 45.4
illus. 45-1.
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fee-splitting rule. 27 If Bank goes further and acquires a security interest in
Lawyer's accounts receivables, the fee-splitting rule is still not violated. 28
Even within the allegedly safe terrain of lending, there are still
disagreements over many subsidiary issues. First, while it is somewhat
settled that the lawyer may pass onto the client loan-related costs (e.g.,
interest) like any other litigation-related expense, even this rule has its
critics. 29 Second, while it appears that the better rule is that a lawyer may
not use the client's recovery as collateral for the loan, even if the loan is
being used for the client's benefit and even if the client consents to such an
arrangement, at least one jurisdiction, Maine, suggests that with client
consent the lender can take a lien in the total recovery. 30 Third, many but
not all jurisdictions hold that the mere fact that that the loan is nonrecourse
(that is, the obligation to repay is triggered only if there is a positive
outcome in the case) does not make it a form of fee splitting. 31 This last
point illuminates the ambiguity at the heart of the fee-splitting prohibition.
Is it the sharing of the lawyer's fee that brings a "loan" within the
prohibition or the contingency of repayment that makes the loan
impermissible? 32 The majority of bar committee opinions that have
reviewed this question hold that the better view is that conditioning the
repayment amount on the size of the lawyer's fee turns a loan into fee

27. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 92-9 (1993), available at http://www.isba.org/
sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/92-09.pdf (stating that establishing a "credit facility" to pay
the lawyers' fee, in return for 10 percent financing charge, does not violate Rule 5.4(a)); Or.
State Bar, Formal Op. 2005-133 (2005), available at https://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/
2005-133.pdf (same); see also Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law:
Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577,608 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Prof'! Ethics Comm'n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 152 (1995),
available
at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89759
(permitting a law firm to open a line of credit with a bank, secured by the firm's
receivables); Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics:
Paying Interest, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 16 ("State ethics committees generally now allow
attorneys to borrow funds for litigation expenses as long as the financing agreements comply
with each state's rules of professional conduct.").
29. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63
DEPAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286307.
30. Compare N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12 (2006), available at http://www.ncbar.com/
ethics/printopinion.asp?id'=753 ("Lawyer may never put a client's funds at risk to obtain a
loan."), and Kreder & Bauer, supra note 28, at 17, with Prof'l Ethics Comm'n Me. Bd. of
Overseers of the Bar, Op. 177 (200 I), available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/
attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89473 ("[T]he attorney may not allow the financing
institution to acquire any lien or other security interest in the client's claim without the
informed consent of the client." (emphasis added)).
31. Compare N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12, and Phila. Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 2003-15
(2003), available at www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion2003-l 5?appNum=I
(permitting nonrecourse loans), with Prof'] Ethics Comm'n Me. Bd. of Overseers of
the Bar, Op. 193 (2007), available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attomey_services/
opinion.html?id=86896, and State Bar of Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 36 (2007), available at http://nvbar.org/sites/default/files/
opinion_36.pdf (prohibiting nonrecourse Joans).
32. For an example where both features were present and no distinction was drawn
between them, see Prof'! Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576 (2006), available
at https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/opinions/501-600/eo57 6. pdf.
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splitting; conditioning repayment of a fixed amount to the success of a case
is not fee splitting. 33
Why is repaying a loan (with funds that could only have come from fees)
not fee splitting? As Larry Ribstein has noted, the line between a loan and
equity can be blurry, and it can be "gamed" by clever drafting. 34 Ethics
opinions are not very helpful in setting out either rationales or criteria to aid
in applying the rule. According to one, a "loan" in which the cost of the
loan increased in lockstep with the success of the lawsuit supported by the
loan was fee splitting because "[b ]y tying the proposed funding fee to a
percentage of the recovery, the lending company would be directly
benefiting from the lawyer's knowledge, skill, experience and time
expended to the detriment of the lawyer, who would be solely responsible
for paying the funding fee." 35 The distinction drawn here between a
nonlawyer enjoying benefits "directly" linked to the lawyer's knowledge,
skill, experience, and time and a nonlawyer "indirectly" benefiting from the
same suggests that the purpose of Rule 5.4(a) must be more than preventing
a nonlawyer from having an equity stake in a lawyer's professional license
and the special privileges that come with it. 36 Therefore, we should look to
other applications of Rule 5.4(a) to nonloan transactions to see if they can
cast a light on what is at stake.
a. Non/awyer Agents Versus Non/awyer Investors
Numerous cases and ethics opinions consider the fee-splitting issue in the
context of payments made by lawyers to independent contractors and
employees. 37 Paying bonuses or contingent fees to experts is ordinarily
permissible but may violate the fee-splitting rule if the payment is
computed as a percentage of the attorney's fee received in a particular

33. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12; Phila. Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 2003-15 . At least one
reported decision discloses the existence of a nonrecourse loan to a law firm where the
repayment amount was a function of the case recovery of the law firm's client. See Lawsuit
Funding, LLC v. Lessoff, No. 650757/2012, 2013 WL 6409971, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
4, 2013).
34. Ribstein noted that the firm McKee Nelson Ernst & Young in the District of
Columbia was an example of the uncertainty between debt and equity in law firm financing.
The firm was capitalized with a nonrecourse loan from an accounting firm accompanied by
certain repayment obligations that may have crossed "the subtle line into 'equity,"' thus
violating the ethics rules "in all 50 states" and possibly even the D.C. rule. Larry E. Ribstein,
Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 1161, 1173
(2001).
35. Prort Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576.
36. "Thus, it cannot be that nonlawyer ownership is just about money and financial
structuring of law firms. Rather, it is the concept of allowing nonlawyers to exercise
'ownership' over a legal practice that lies at the heart of this debate." N.Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP 71 (2012), available at
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26682.
37. See Patterson v. Law Office of Lauri J. Goldstein, P.A., 980 So. 2d 1234, 1234 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Atkins v. Tinning, 865 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App. 1993); see also
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. l; D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004),
available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm.
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matter. 38 A similar line of authority relates to the payment of bonuses to
nonlawyer employees of law firms. While Model Rule 5.4(a)(3) is an
express exception to the fee-splitting rule, permitting the compensation of
nonlawyer employees on a profit-sharing basis, some cases and ethics
opinions state that the amount of compensation may not be tied to or
contingent upon the firm's receipt of a fee from a particular matter. 39
Ethics opinions barring fee splitting with nonlawyer agents emphasize
that there is an ineliminable risk that, when an agent's earnings are
contingent on the outcome of a case on which he works, he may act against
the client's interests by (1) deciding where to invest time and other
resources among multiple clients based on which case promises the greatest
reward, or (2) "steering" new clients to the lawyer even though they
otherwise would be better served by going to a different lawyer. 40
These risks are not present--or are not present in the same way-in the
case of a nonlawyer investor. The incentive for an agent to self-deal is
different than for an investor-passive or active--to use whatever leverage
she may have to maximize the value of her equity stake. First, although
much of the controversy surrounding reforming Rule 5.4(a), from the Kutak
Commission to the most recent efforts led by the ABA' s Commission on
Ethics 20/20 Alternative Law Practice Structures (ALPS) Working Group,
focused on nonlawyers as either employers or partners, it is far more likely
that nonlawyer ownership will take the form of investment capital. 41
Investors are less likely to take steps to cause lawyers to commit
malpractice or to degrade the reputational capital of the firm. As Edward
38. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-104 (1991), available at
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-104.cfm (finding that it was
permissible to pay a contingent fee to tax expert, but the fee could not be calculated as a
percentage of the tax savings realized by the client because that would violate the feesplitting rule); accord Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prorl Responsibility,
Informal Op. No. 93-164 (1993), available at 1993 WL 851259.
39. See, e.g., Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1154-55 (Ind. 1997); In re
Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 367 S.E.2d 17, 17-18 (S .C. 1988); State Bar v.
Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tex. App. 1991); Prof! Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 02-1
(2002), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+
OPINION+02-1 ?opendocument; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Op.
887 (2011), available at http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/
Opinions826900/EO_887.pdf; N .Y . State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Op.
733 (2000), available at http: //old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/
Opinions676750/EO_733 .pdf (stating that a nonlawyer marketer may receive a bonus based
on the firm's overall profits but not on particular matters referred to the firm as the result of
the marketer's efforts); N.C. State Bar, RPC Op. 147 (1993), available at
http ://www.ncbar.com/ethics/printopinion.asp?id=l47; Phila. Bar Ass'n, Op. 2004-3 (2004),
available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion2004-3?appNum=3.
40. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. 1; D.C. Bar,
Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/
opinion322.cfm.
41. The debate over the Kutak Commission's recommendations was captured by the
following possibility offered by its critics: what if a large consumer retail store (like Sears)
began to hire lawyers and paralegals and offered legal services in the store. 2 HAzARD &
HODES, supra note 24, § 45.3 ; Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The
Problem ofNon-lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 60810 (1994) (describing problems with nonlawyer partners in a multidisciplinary partnership).
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Adams and John Matheson have pointed out, "nonlawyer-controlled law
firms, which could take the form of private entities with nonlawyer
ownership or publicly traded corporations, would be in the business of
providing legal services and would succeed only by providing sound legal
judgment to consumers, as is the case now."42 Further, if the investor is
investing in the lawyer's net profits, and not individual cases, then the
investor faces the same malpractice risk as the lawyer. If the lawyer
accedes to investor's demands to recommend to the client an action in
violation of her professional responsibilities, the lawyer's malpractice risk
will be reflected in lower net profits, which will reduce the investor's return
on her investment. 4 3
Finally, the risk that nonlawyer investors might "steer" clients to lawyers
inappropriate for their needs was one of the main rationales for the
Professional Ethics Commission for the State Bar of Texas Opinion Nos.
467 and 576. 44 The risk, as stated, seems far-fetched in general (a lawyer's
landlord is not often in the position to refer clients), and in the case of
investment by hedge funds or shareholders, it seems especially far-fetched:
investors in a contingent fee firm are not in a better position than the firm to
identify and persuade potential clients to retain the firm; that is, an investor
lacks what one would think is precisely the type of expertise that he wishes
to purchase with his investment. 45

b. Particular Matter Versus General Firm Revenue
As noted in the section above, one of the reasons that ethics committees
found fee splitting with nonlawyer agents of lawyers objectionable is that it
42. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal
for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. I, 16 (1998) ("Indeed, if the
stock of the firm were publicly traded, the value of a firm's stock would directly reflect the
market's perception of the ability of the firm to render quality, professional legal services.
To the extent that the law firm's reputation is tarnished because it provides inadequate
services, the stockholders stand to lose.").
43. This prophylactic reflects the same incentive structure built into MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.5(e) (2013), which permits a firm that refers a case to another firm to
share in the latter's fees as long as it also shares the latter's malpractice risk.
44. As the Commission noted in Opinion No. 576:
The Committee reasoned [in Opinion No. 467] that a percentage rental agreement
is prohibited for lawyers because an arrangement under which a nonlawyer
landlord could receive a percentage of legal fees earned by a law firm would create
an incentive for the landlord to refer legal business to the law firm, a result that
Rule 5.04(a) is intended to prevent. Similarly [in this case], the proposed
arrangement here would create an incentive for the lending company to refer cases
to lawyers using its services.
Prof! Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576 (2006), available at
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/opinions/50 l -600/eo576. pdf.
45. Some writers have suggested that investment in a firm's profits could be restated as
derivatives, which would create certain advantages, especially in terms of raising capital. See
Bruce MacEwen, Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Larry Ribstein, Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity
Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 76 (2008). Proposals for law firms to raise capital
through stock offerings would seem simply impossible in a Model Rules jurisdiction. Erin J.
Cox, Comment, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing To Waste: Reforming the Business
ofLaw for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REv. 511, 526 (2009).
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occurred in a piecemeal fashion. If, on the other hand, compensation is tied
to general firm revenue, the fee-splitting rule is not violated. 46 As one bar
committee put it, the Model Rules "generally stand for the proposition that
paying a percentage of firm net profits to nonlawyer employees is
permissible, whereas paying a percentage of a fee in an identifiable case or
series of cases is not."47 The distinction drawn between firm receivables or
revenue, which is comprised of a pool of fees received by the firm, and the
fees received in a specific case, like the distinction between loan and equity,
is one of the clues that will help us understand the rationale behind Rule
5.4(a).
A handful of opinions deny that there is a difference between the revenue
from a single case, a set of cases, or a firm's general revenue of
profitability. In Texas, a bar committee held that a lawyer could not pay his
landlord rent that increased (or decreased) depending on his firm's "gross
receipts" because the contract would violate Texas Rule 5.04(a). 48 Even
more directly in tension with the proposition that a lawyer may pay an
investor a portion of his firm's net profits is a decision by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that involved an investor who sought to invest in a lawyer's
future "products liability litigation."49 The court upheld the ruling of a
disciplinary action against a lawyer in an unrelated matter but endorsed the
conclusion that the investment was fee splitting.so The Wisconsin case
might be distinguishable from the investment analyzed in D.C. Opinion No.
322 in one regard: the investor in the former case was investing in a
defined class of cases (products liability) while the nonlawyer in the latter
case was receiving compensation based on the lawyer' s firm's net profits.
The Texas case can only be explained as either an outlier or a mistake.
2. Fee Splitting in D.C.
Since 1990 the District of Columbia has permitted nonlawyers to form
law partnerships with lawyers.SI This is a form of nonlawyer investment,
although it was designed to accommodate the demands by other
professionals such as accountants and financial planners to form
partnerships with lawyers. 52 Firms that partner with professionals from
other disciplines do not typically bill their clients through contingent fee
agreements, although nothing in the language of Rule 5.4(b) prevents the

46. See, e.g. , State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-143 (1992), available at
https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-143.cfm.
47. D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legalethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm (emphasis added).
48. Prof! Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 467 (1990), available at
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/Opinions/401-500/0467 .html.
49. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Van Cura, 504 N.W.2d 610, 610 (Wis.
1993).
50. Seeid.at611-12.
51. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b).
52. Id. R. 5.4 cmt. 3 & 4.
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splitting of a contingent fee with a nonlawyer partner. 53 In the words of one
commentator, Rule 5.4(b) has "fairly stringent conditions that few firms
have thought it worth satisfying."54 Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes
state that Rule 5.4(b) requires the investor to be active in the law firm
formed with the lawyer-in other words, "the nonlawyers must actively
assist the lawyers who provide legal services." 55 In addition, the active
involvement by the nonlawyer must satisfy the test of "ancillary services,"
which means a service "directly linked to the legal services being provided
to the client." 56
B. Control of a Lawyer by a Nonlawyer Investor

The Model Rules are designed to preserve the independence of a
lawyer's professional judgment. This is the clear purpose of Rules 1.8(f)
and 5.4(c). Rule 5.4(a) preserves a lawyer's independent judgment by
protecting her against control by nonlawyers. "[F]ee splitting between
lawyer and layman . . . poses the possibility of control by the layperson,
interested in his own profit, rather than the client's fate." 57 Fear of the
control of lawyers by nonlawyers was one of the constant themes of critics
of the Kutak Commission and the Ethics 20/20 ALPS Working Group. 58
This is not to deny, however, that other concerns were raised with equal
fervor, including the fear that splitting fees with nonlawyers would weaken
lawyer self-regulation and would ill serve clients by allowing client
confidences to be discovered. 59
As Bruce Green has noted, professional independence can mean multiple
things: independence from clients, third parties, and the judiciary.60
However, as he notes, Rule 5.4 is "essentially a conflict of interest rule"

53. See D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm.
54. DISTRJCT OF COLUMBIA LEGAL ETHICS: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF LAWYERING IN
THE DISTRJCT OF COLUMBIA § 5.4:300 (David B. Isbell ed., 2007), available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/dc/narr/DC_NARR_5.HTM#5.4:300.
55. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 45 .6.
56. Id.
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-392 (1995) (citation
omitted); see also Prof I Ethics Comm'n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 193 (2007),
available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attomey_services/opinion.html?id=86896 ("The
underlying rationale for [Maine's) rule is that any fee sharing arrangement creates an
unacceptable risk that the professional independence of the lawyer will be influenced by the
non-lawyer who has an interest in the attorney's fee.").
58. During a debate over Kutak recommendations, a "delegate quipped that the proposed
abolition of the prohibitions would be a 'breach of the golden rule. The one who has the
gold makes the rules, and the one that has the gold under [then proposed] 5.4, is going to be
a non-lawyer. "' Andrews, supra note 27, at 605--06.
59. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 36, at 67-77; Ted Schneyer,

"Professionalism " As Pathology: The ABA 's Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer
Ownership ofLaw Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 123-24 (2012).
60. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers ' Professional Independence:
Overrated or
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013).
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designed to protect the client from third parties. 61 As one critic of the
liberalization of Rule 5.4(a) put it:
Lawyers have, among others, three core values built into our Codes of
Professional Responsibility that the [reformers] want us to eliminate-our
total independence from outside influence in the representation of our
clients, our undivided loyalty toward our clients, and our obligation to
maintain their confidences and secrets. . . . How can lawyers function for
their clients when their independence and loyalty are necessarily to be
divided between their responsibilities to clients and their responsibilities
to their [nonlawyer] partners or employers?62
The concern for clients expressed here is threefold: (1) that they receive
advice that has not been influenced by third parties; (2) that their ends are
placed above all others (loyalty); and (3) that their confidences be
maintained. The question of maintaining confidences is an important one,
but existing rules of professional responsibility and evidence may be
sufficient to answer it, and in any event, this question is outside the scope of
this Article. 63 The first and second concerns are closely connected to the
concerns raised by the bar committee interpretations of Rule 5.4(a) above
and are the concern of this Article.
1. Loyalty
Like "professional independence," loyalty can mean multiple things in
legal ethics. 64 It can mean the technical obligations set out in the Model
Rules, which Eli Wald described as a "floor,". or the slightly more
demanding fiduciary-like obligations set out in the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers, or the aspiration of zealous advocacy and
"warm zeal" suggested by case law and some commentators. 65 At a
minimum, the lawyer is an agent of the client, and her primary task is to
"promot[e] the objectives of the client" within the limits of the law. 66
Rule 5.4 is clearly designed to strengthen client loyalty. 67 Critics of
nonlawyer investment have argued that loyalty to clients will be
compromised by demands of investors to cut expenses or divert resources to
cases on the basis of their potential return to the law firm and not based on
the needs of the firm's clients. 68 Critics have also pointed to the possibility
61. Id. at 616.
62. Robert L. Ostertag, Multidisciplinary Practice: Our Profession ls Not for Sale,
ABA GPSOLO, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 22, 27-28.
63. See, e.g., Adams & Matheson, supra note 42, at 19-21.
64. See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case ofAttorneys' Loyalty to Clients,
40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 919-20 (2009).
65. Id. at 920, 923, 928-29.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. e (2000).
67. See Eleanor W. Myers, Examining Independence and Loyalty, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 857,
861 (1999) (suggesting that concern about independence from third parties "is primarily a
concern about impairing client loyalty").
68. See Carson, supra note 41, at 611-13 ("A non-lawyer partner's primary concern is
likely to be a good return on his investment."); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of
the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the
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that nonlawyer owners will accidentally or purposefully cause their own
law firms to be conflicted out of cases due to their other nonlegal business
activities, thus depriving clients of representation.69 Finally, critics have
expressed the concern that nonlawyer investors would influence the
substantive advice that lawyers provide their clients based on various
business and political interests that may be affected by the client's cases.7°
These objections have been met by persuasive rebuttals that point out that
while agents of lawyers might act in ways that are self-dealing, owners of
law firms are incentivized to act in ways that maximize the law firm's longterm value. 71 But these rebuttals have force in inverse proportion to the
type of nonlawyer control under discussion. Where the fear is that the
nonlawyer will spend less money on a client, or retain the "wrong" clients,
it is easy to see why some version of the efficient market hypothesis could
meet this fear. The efficient market hypothesis has some empirical support
from the experience of bank lending to law firms. As noted above, the line
between a loan and equity is so difficult to draw because of what was
termed "clever" drafting-that is, because a loan covenant can be drafted to
provide the lender with (in theory) a great deal of control over the future
actions of the borrower. 72 For this reason, bank loans to law firms of this
nature are analogous to law firm equity ownership. While it is difficult to
gather much empirical data due to the confidential nature of the loan
agreements, the relationship between banks and law firms is not completely
opaque. We know, for example, that since the financial crisis of 2008,
banks have begun to exercise increasing control over law firms by setting
out detailed constraints in advance. 73 What is interesting is what the banks
Issue of MDPs , 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2000) (arguing that Rule 5.4 guards against
"interference by nonlaw trained masters who wish us to take short cuts to maximize
profits").
69. See Carson, supra note 41 , at 619 ("Conflicts of interest could even be used to the
non-lawyer partner's advantage. A virtually unlimited ability to invest would provide
corporate and some individual non-lawyer partners with a powerful means to control the
market for legal services. For example, a corporation could control consumer and
competitor access to legal counsel by maintaining a partnership interest in each of the best
law firms in a particular city.").
70. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the

American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 138 (2000) (discussing the
possibility that real estate investors in law firms could control advice to clients---<>r worse,
the manner that legal service is delivered to clients-in ways that systematically benefit the
real estate industry and harm the client). See generally Fox, supra note 68 (applying the
same argument to accountants as investors).
71. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 42, at 39; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 70,
at 139; Ribstein, supra note 34, at 1173- 74; Cox, supra note 45, at 528.
72. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 774.
73. See Cox, supra note 45, at 524 ("[T]wo main lenders to firms-units of Citigroup
Inc. and the bank formerly known as Wachovia-have started attaching more stringent terms
to loans, further eroding the desirability of debt. Firms seeking to extend credit lines must
now comply with detailed disclosures, and institute a litany of changes demanded by lenders
who have been burned by law firms now in default. Citigroup, for instance, now insists that
indebted law firms 'plac[e] strict internal controls on discretionary spending, cut[] bonuses,
freez[e] associate salaries, postpon[e] new hires or initiatives, lay[] off professional and
administrative staff, and revamp[] partner compensation schedules to slow distributions and
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seem not to do'. Banks do not, it seems, tell lawyers whether to spend x
dollars on Case A or to tell Client C that a settlement offer of y dollars is
reasonable and that in the lawyer's professional opinion, the client should
accept it. It seems that lenders have not been inclined to demand this level
of control, or (and this amounts to the same thing) it has not been attractive
to lawyers to grant this level of control in exchange for capital. 74
The critics might concede all or some of the previous arguments but
retreat to the position that even when nonlawyer investors subjectively
attempt to promote the legal ends of the clients of law firms, clients will
always do worse than if the lawyers with whom they worked did not share
ownership of the lawyer's practice. This assumes that nonlawyers are either
subject to unconscious bias and that lawyers conform their behavior to these
biases in ways that harm clients or that nonlawyers consciously try to
promote the legal ends of clients, and their well-intentioned efforts harm
clients. And, if either (or both) of these propositions were true, then the
client could still be harmed even if the lawyer were loyal, for the lawyer
herself is not being asked to do something that is on its face disloyal to the
client; the lawyer now faces the problem of what to do with a nonlawyer
whose desire to promote the client's ends is sincere, but misguided. While
one could describe this as a problem of loyalty for the lawyer (the lawyer
has a duty to tell the client that the ends sought by the nonlawyer are well
intentioned but wrong), this is really more a problem of different
professional values. The problem for the lawyer, if she were frank with her
client, is not that the nonlawyer investor is asking the lawyer to be disloyal
to the client, but that the nonlawyer investor is asking the lawyer to act in
violation of her professional "core values," which may understandably be
different from those sincerely held by the nonlawyer.75

improve cash positions."' (alteration in original) (quoting Susan A. Berson, Loans and
Moans: Past Firm Failures Mean Tougher Credit Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 30, 30)).
74. This is not to deny that litigation investment creates incentives for lawyers's selfdealing at the expense of the client. I discuss what I term the "Self-Dealing Problem" in
litigation investment in another context. See Anthony J. Sebok, Litigation Investment and
Legal Ethics: What Are the Real Issues?, 55 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2014). A
decision by a funder to advance $1 million or $2 million for legal expenses means $1 million
or $2 million dollars for the attorney(s) who will now have more income. It would be nai've
to act as if the interests of a claimholder and her attorney are always in alignment when the
question arises whether litigation should begin or be continued. But it would be equally
nai've to think that there is anything new about this potential ethical conflict. It exists all the
time--it is an inescapable feature of the fact that law is a business. The "Self-Dealing
Problem" is a problem, but not one limited to litigation investment.
75. The "core values" debate in the legal ethics literature has produced a large literature
in itself. In the context of the debate over amending Rule 5.4(a), the literature has played a
crucial role. See Schneyer, supra note 59, at 130-31 ("For many lawyers, the profession's
core values are the heart of lawyer professionalism. Consequently, many of the comments
opposing the [ABA Ethics 20/20] Working Group's proposal expressed concerns that, by
allowing even a very limited form of nonlawyer ownership, the proposal would compromise
core values.").
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2. Legal Advice Uninfluenced by Nonlegal Values
One goal of Rule 5.4(a) is to ensure that the nonlawyer owner does not
influence the lawyer. But this goal has to be unpacked. What does it mean
to be "influenced" or "controlled" in this context? Obviously, if a lawyer
converses with a nonlawyer and, based on that conversation, comes to a
conclusion about a legal issue, there is nothing illegitimate about that. For
example, a lawyer might, in conversation with a scientist, come to a
conclusion about the chances of his client proving cause-in-fact in a tort suit
and then advise the client to settle at a lower amount than she had
previously recommended.
In the example above, we can observe two things. First, the lawyer was
not compelled to draw the conclusion about causation she drew (although
the scientist may have believed that the conclusion was "compelled" by the
facts and "laws" of science). Second, the issue was not one involving legal
judgment; the nonlawyer influenced the lawyer's judgment about a
scientific fact, and the legal judgment came later, produced by the lawyer
applying her legal skills and knowledge to the newly revised scientific
judgment. A final observation: the process described above seems both
normal and desirable. By this I mean it is exactly what a client would want
her lawyer to do. In other words, loyalty to the client requires the lawyer to
sometimes be influenced by a nonlawyer.
For the argument that clients must have access to advice uninfluenced by
nonlawyers to work, there must be a domain of advice unlike scientific
advice that cannot be adequately generated if nonlawyers play a role in its
formation. It follows from the claim that the introduction of "nonlawyer
reasons" into the formation of this domain of advice is detrimental to the
client that the lawyer must control the formation of this domain of advice-hence the "right" of the lawyer to be free from nonlawyer control in this
domain. The foregoing is merely a theoretical expression of an intuition
that clearly motivates the "core values" argument in legal ethics. 76 If one
accepts its premise-that lawyers think about their clients' ends differently
from nonlawyers-then its conclusion follows, which is that nonlawyers
cannot be the final judge of whether their reasons should reach the client.
And from this it follows that clients must be shielded from nonlawyers'
influence in the formation of legal advice even if they want it. 77
76. Why lawyers have this intuition can be subjected to numerous types of analysis,
some less charitable than others. One of the best attempts at explaining the "core values"
belief structure in its relation to Rule 5.4 is Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications
for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1145-46 (2000) (describing the five
premises upon which the "core values rationale" relies).
77. See id. ("Even if the legal services were rendered exclusively by lawyers in the
multidisciplinary firm, these lawyers could not be counted on to serve skillfully and in
accordance with the legal profession's ethics rules .... The clients should not be allowed to
contract to accept service under a different set of norms from those governing the attorneyclient relationship, or even to assume the risk that the lawyers would violate their duties to
their clients, because their clients would have to be self-destructive or misguided to do so."
(emphasis added)).
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C. Why Can't a Client Order Her Lawyer To

Accept the Legal Views of a Nonlawyer?
One might ask why, if a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to her client, the
client could not, in theory, order the lawyer to allow her legal reasoning to
be influenced by a nonlawyer' s efforts at reasoning about legal questions. 78
The argument that the client cannot be allowed to do this, because the
lawyer's duty to the client is nonwaivable, is circular. It has to be grounded
in an argument. If the argument is that a client cannot understand the
consequences of giving such an order to her lawyer, it may make sense to
ask whether this may be true for some clients but not others and some types
of nonlawyers and not others. 79
Before these more nuanced questions are asked, however, a more general
point should be made. The question posed in this section might seem to be
a red herring in the following way. Perhaps Rule 5.4 should be amended to
allow a client to order her lawyer's legal reasoning to be influenced by a
nonlawyer after the client has learned something about the case, or after it
has progressed, so that the client's choice is not only about a class of
reasons but also contingent on the identity of the nonlawyer and the specific
facts of a case to which that class of reasons will be applied. But the
problem of nonlawyer investment in law firms-especially as framed in this
Article, where the investment comes from the capital markets-has nothing
to do with the quaint hypothetical posed at the beginning of this section. A
client cannot possibly know in advance the identity of the nonlawyers who
will affect her lawyer's legal reasoning, or how they will do so, or when
they will do so, if all she knows is that her lawyer is employed by a firm
that is partly owned by shareholders, a private equity firm, or a consulting
group.
This objection is very serious. Recall the arguments made earlier about
the market pressures that will produce a hands-off approach in the work of
the lawyers in firms owned by nonlawyers. The question is not, "Can a
client rationally choose to have her lawyer influenced in her day-to-day
legal practice on the client's behalf?" That question is more relevant for
certain models of alternative litigation funding. 80 The question I want to
pose here is, granting that there is some subtle effect on the legal practice of
lawyers in a firm partly owned by nonlawyers that would potentially
influence the reasons of lawyers working in that firm, is it rational for a
client to seek to retain such a firm? The answer, it seems to me, depends on
the benefits that accrue to the client in exchange for allowing her lawyers to
78. In theory, a client could require her lawyer to confer with, and perhaps even to
follow instructions from, a nonlawyer with regard to her case where the client has signed a
contract directly with the nonlawyer. This could happen in the case of litigation investment
contracts. See Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791 (2012). It most certainly happens
when people who become clients sign insurance contracts, as I will explain in the next
section.
79. See id. at 2829-30 (discussing the benefits ofnonlawyer participation in litigation).
80. See generally Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 455 (2012).
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be influenced by nonlawyers. One such benefit, especially for plaintiffs
seeking contingency fee representation, is that her lawyer will have
sufficient capital to pursue her case to its completion. The story of the
Woburn litigation in A Civil Action is a sobering reminder of what happens
when an attorney attempts to complete complex litigation with insufficient
capital. 81 Even if the advantage to clients is less dramatic, corning in the
form of reduced hourly fees (and a well-insured, solvent lawyer to sue in
the event of malpractice), the transaction may be worthwhile to the client.
II. WHEN CLIENTS CAN TRANSFER CONTROL TO NONLAWYERS :
THE CASE OF INSURANCE LAW

Another way to ask whether there is something so wrong about a client
ordering her lawyer to accept the legal views of a nonlawyer, such that it
should be treated as a nonwaivable part of the Model Rules, is to ask
whether courts allow clients to do the same thing in other parts of the law.
The answer is that we do-in the context of the everyday, "garden variety,"
liability insurance contract.
In almost every liability insurance contract, the insurer demands from the
insured that it cede control of any litigation that may occur in the future
where the insured is a defendant. The insurer makes this demand a
condition of coverage by the insurer.82 The courts that have permitted
insureds to transfer control over litigation have done so without any
illusions about what they were permitting. The Missouri Supreme Court
observed in In re Allstate Insurance Co.83 that under the typical third-party
liability insurance contract
[t]he insurer has the contract right to direct the litigation against [the]
insured. It may evaluate claims and decide whether to settle . . . . It may
make economic decisions without the assent of the insured. The insured
may want a quick settlement to eliminate further demands on time and
energy, but the insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is
forthcoming. Or the insurer may accept a settlement offer even though
the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from fault. The
insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be had,
and what experts to hire. It also has the right to select counsel to defend
its interests.84
81. See Robert F. Blomquist, Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, the American Legal
Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977 (1996)
(reviewing JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995)).
82. Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1583, 1594-95 (1994) ("[Standard general liability insurance
contracts] grant[] the company plenary and exclusive control of the defense. Ordinarily, the
company can select counsel to defend the insured, discharge appointed counsel and name a
replacement without the insured's consent, bargain with appointed counsel over fees,
monitor counsel and direct litigation strategy, require counsel to inform the company of
settlement demands and procedural developments, direct counsel to initiate settlement
discussions, settle claims without an insured's consent and decline to settle claims over an
insured's objection, and file appeals." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
83. 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
84. Id. at 952.
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There is a downside for the insured to exclusive insurance company
control. 85 This has been exemplified by several cases. 86 In response to the
risks summarized in In re Allstate Insurance Co., courts developed various
doctrines to protect the insured from the reality that all the incentives
pointed towards the insurer sacrificing the insured's interests after litigation
has begun. The most significant of these is the duty to settle in good faith. 87
The duty of good faith is implied by the law's "covenant of good faith
and fair dealing," which is imputed into insurance policies. 88 The duty is
breached if the insurer's conduct during the insured's litigation damages
"the very protection or security which the insured sought to gain by buying
insurance." 89 Although, in theory, the duty applies to any aspect of the
insurer's behavior that affects the interests of the insured, in practice courts
are usually unwilling to find violations of the duty where insurers have
settled within policy limits. 9 Charles Silver and Kent Syverud call these
"full coverage cases" and note that the disputes that arise from these cases
have to do with objections by insureds over the noneconomic injuries they
suffer resulting from the insurer's decision to settle the lawsuit against the
insured and pay the entire amount of the settlement. 91 Full coverage cases
are the best place to look to see what limits, if any, courts place on the
transfer of control of litigation by insureds. Where an insured (or some
other party) is asking a court to set aside the contract terms that give the
insurer control over the litigation in a full coverage case, the conflict is not
over the settlement amount, but something else--either how to conduct the
litigation or whether to settle at all. The dispute is about control over legal
judgment: who has it, and whether the law can allow a nonlawyer to have
final say over the implementation of that judgment, notwithstanding the
views of the litigant or her own attorney.
A cursory review of the case law shows that, in full coverage cases,
common law courts uphold the insurance contract as written. The clearest
example of this comes from cases involving doctors who object to their
insurer settling medical malpractice claims within policy limits. Doctors
resent being sued in medical malpractice and probably believe that

°

85. Silver, supra note 82, at 1597.
86. See, e.g., Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting
that the insurance company's appointed defense attorney took advantage of the insured by
"actively working to protect [the insurance company] and persisting in manipulating [the
insured] against her own best interests"); Rosenzweig v. Blinshteyn, 544 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867
(App. Div. 1989) (encountering a defense counsel appointed by the insurance carrier who
adopted a defense to avoid the payment of any monies by the insurance company, regardless
of the consequences to the insureds, who were his "ostensible clients").
87. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Duty ofLiability Insurer To Settle or Compromise, 40
A.L.R.2o 168 (2009); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990).
88. See, e.g., Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
89. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 573 (Ariz. 1986). The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century.
See Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622,624 (N.Y. 1914).
90. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255,263 (1995); Syverud, supra note 87, at 1159.
91. Silver & Syverud, supra note 90, at 263-64.
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settlements injure their reputations. Even if they can be confident that
settlements will be sealed or protected from public access, doctors may still
feel, with some reason, that they have a right to a public judgment by a
court where allegations against them impugn their professional (and
perhaps personal) character. 92 The short answer to these insureds is:
"Tough luck." As James Fischer puts it, "These individuals have, of
course, an option. They can defend at their own expense or they can
bargain for 'consent to settle' provisions."93 Subject to the rights gained if
the insured purchases them back from the insurer, the standard liability
insurance contract does not require an insurer to take into account the
insured's litigation preferences if it settles within policy limits. 94
An example of the scope of control allowed under the standard liability
insurance contract can be seen in Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.95 The insureds, a physician and his wife, were sued by
another physician, their former business partner, on various civil claims
including defamation and intentional interference with contractual
relationships. 96 The insured filed counterclaims. 97 The insurer provided an
attorney for all the claims but one, the intentional interference with
contractual relationships, which the insureds defended on their own. 98 Over
the objections of the insureds, the insurer concluded a global settlement
with the former partner, and all claims, including the intentional
interference with contractual relationships and the counterclaims, were
dismissed. 99 The insureds sued the insurer, claiming that the insurer
secured a settlement that was favorable to the insurer and not favorable to
92. See 1 0AVID w. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 10.06
(2014) (discussing physicians' resistance to settlement). Of course, doctors are not alone in
feeling this way. Drivers may also feel this to some degree as well, and resent when their
insurance company settles what they believe is a frivolous whiplash claim instead of
resisting the groundless claim until it is dropped or defeated in court:
The policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault. A defense
limited to the issue of damages may be perceived by the policyholder as an
acknowledgment of legal responsibility. For some individuals such an admission
may be difficult to make even in the face of clear evidence of fault. Some
individuals can live with the vagaries of life. They will accept the decision to
focus the litigation on minimizing the loss even though it means admitting, or
being understood as admitting, responsibility for conduct they do not actually
believe was legally wrongful. Other individuals will find such conduct morally
and emotionally repugnant.
James M. Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder Interests, Defense Counsel's Professional Duties,
and the Allocation ofPower To Control the Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 40 (2008).
93. Id. A "consent to settle" provision gives the insured control over whether to settle,
but not the conduct of the litigation in other regards. Syverud, supra note 87, at 1175-76.
94. Syverud, supra note 87, at 1159; see Webb v. Witt, 876 A.2d 858, 867 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (holding that the absence of a consent to settle clause is not against
public policy; "[p]resumably, the premium paid to the insurer reflects the presence or
absence of a consent to settle clause").
95 . 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2003).
96. Id. at 705-06.
97. Id. at 706.
98. Id. at 706-07.
99. Id. at 707.
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the insureds and it coerced the insureds into accepting the settlement by
refusing to pay invoices of their independent defense counseI. 100 The
settlement allegedly impaired the insureds' negotiating position; caused
injury to their reputation; precluded them from filing a malicious
prosecution action against their former partner; provided funds to the
former partner to use to finance his defense of future lawsuits brought by
the insureds; deprived the insureds of insurance financing for their future
litigation against the former partner; and impacted the insureds' future
insurability. 101 The court upheld the dismissal of the insureds' suit. 102 The
court conceded that, by settling the claim, the insurer exposed the insureds
to costs, including unwanted media attention and the loss of potentially
valid counterclaims. 103 But, the court also noted:
These are the ordinary consequences of settlement. . . . Liability
insurance exists primarily to protect the insured' s finances. The covenant
of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to minimize the
possibility of an award that exceeds the policy's limits-it does not
require the insurer to fight a legal action until the bitter end when the
costs of defense exceed the benefit to be achieved. I04

The court noted that the insureds' complaint "[put] a reverse spin" on bad
faith doctrine: instead of arguing that the insurer acted in bad faith when it
unreasonably refused to settle a case within policy limits, they were arguing
that the insurer engaged in bad faith conduct when it accepted a settlement
over the insureds' objection even though there was no risk to the insureds of
an excess judgment. 1os The insured' s desire to control the litigation, while
understandable, is something they gave away when they bought insurance.
The protection the law provides them in the wake of that decision-the
doctrine of good faith--does not require the insurer to take into account
"the. entire range of the insured's well-being," but just one thing: the
monetary judgment at risk in the claim against the insured. 106

100. Id. at 708.
101. Id. at 706-08.
102. Id. at 708-09.
103. Id. at 712 ("The decision to settle rather than continue litigation invariably involves a
conflict between the desire to vindicate oneself and the desire to minimize the costs of
litigation and avoid the risk of loss. Defendants who settle face an uphill battle in
convincing others, including members of the interested public or the media, that they were
completely innocent of the charges. Moreover, when a defendant pays money or gives up
something of value to settle a claim, he or she loses the ability to later pursue a malicious
prosecution claim.").
104. Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 713 (citing W. Polymer Tech. , Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78
(Ct. App. 1995)).
106. Id. at 711-12; see, e.g., Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians' Profl Liab.
Ins. Trust, 591 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992); Jon Epstein, Annotation, Liability of Insurer to
Insured for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment to
Insured, 18 A.L.R.5TH 474 (1994).
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CONCLUSION

This Article argues that the reform of the prohibition on fee splitting
should begin by analyzing why nonlawyers want control. The reason for
this starting point is threefold. First, the fear that nonlawyers will use
control to self-deal in a disloyal fashion, while legitimate in some contexts,
may be pure fiction in others. Second, the fear that nonlawyers will use
control to influence the reasons that clients receive concerning legal
decisionmaking, while genuine, needs to be balanced against client
autonomy: loyalty to clients may require lawyers (and nonlawyers) to
allow clients to hear opinions from whomever the client chooses. Third,
and finally, client autonomy to involve nonlawyers in legal decisionmaking
is not an aspiration or a theoretical possibility. This concept is quite real
and is defended vigorously by the courts in the context of third-party
liability insurance contracts. It is not clear why similar autonomy should
not be encouraged with equal vigor in the context of third-party nonlawyer
investment in law firms where there is a demand by clients for lawyers who
are employed by firms owned in part by nonlawyers.

